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THE OUTCOME OF INFLUENCE:
HITLER’S AMERICANMODEL AND
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL HISTORY
Mary L . Dudziak*
HITLER’S AMERICANMODEL: THE UNITED STATES AND THEMAKING
OF NAZI RACE LAW. By James Q . Whitman. Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press. 2017. P. 161. Cloth, $24.95; paper,
$14.95.
On July 17, 1935, William E. Dodd, the U.S. Ambassador to Germany,
sent a disturbing dispatch to the Secretary of State: “SIR: I have the honor to
report that the anti-Jewish wave, which evidence from all sides [is] showing
to be gaining accumulative strength, has lately entered upon a particularly
ugly phase.”1 American concern about anti-Semitism in Germany was not
new, but Dodd warned that what had been an “ever-present undercurrent
seems now to be developing into an offensive distinguished as much by the
efficacy of its apparent organization by official quarters as by its brutality
and ruthlessness.”2 Germans were now using a “new device . . . the forces of
the law, in contravention to the terms of the law itself,” to prevent intermar-
riage between Jews and “Aryans.”3 The episode precipitating Dodd’s report
was a court decision upholding the refusal of a clerk in the town of Bad Sui-
za, Germany, to grant a marriage license to a Jewish woman and a man iden-
tified as Aryan. Such marriages were not unlawful in Germany at that time,
but the court thought that the clerk “could not be expected to sanction a un-
ion ‘adulterating Aryan blood and rendering it useless for all time from the
national point of view.’ ”4 More disturbing, the State Secret Police of Breslau
apprehended six Jewish men and “six so-called German women” for “racial
disgrace of a character dangerous to public safety and order.”5 Their crimes
were being engaged to each other, or simply being seen together. Their dis-
* Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. I am grateful
to my colleague Deborah Dinner for comments on an earlier draft.
1. Letter from William E. Dodd, Ambassador in Ger., to the Sec’y of State (July 17,
1935), in 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1935, THE
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH; EUROPE 401, 401 (1952), https://history.state.gov/
historicaldocuments/frus1935v02/d302 [https://perma.cc/8G98-5NSL].
2 . Id .
3 . Id .
4 . Id .
5 . Id .
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regard for “the racial commandments of our Reich,” the local press reported,
meant that these couples would be sent to a concentration camp.6
The concerned tone of Dodd’s dispatch, and the fact that punishment
for intermarriage warranted diplomatic notice on the part of the United
States, evokes different kinds of reactions from contemporary readers.
Knowing the brutality and inhumanity that would be coming to Hitler’s
Germany,7 it is chilling to read this account and welcome to see American
concern. But Dodd’s response is also curious. In the United States in 1935,
thirty states outlawed marriage between whites and blacks, with some more
broadly outlawing interracial marriage.8 African Americans were brutally
tortured and killed for perceived violations of racial norms.9 Did American
diplomats reflect on the similarity? If German practices warranted interna-
tional attention, was the same true of American racism? And perhaps most
important of all, had American race law found its way to Germany so that
American law itself might be complicit?
In his powerful book, James Q. Whitman10 answers this last question
with his title: Hitler’s American Model: The United States and the Making of
Nazi Race Law. He does not argue that American law helped enable the Hol-
ocaust. His argument is careful and is more focused: “[W]hen the leading
Nazi jurists assembled in early June 1934 to debate how to institutionalize
racism in the new Third Reich, they began by asking how the Americans did
it” (p. 113). The Germans did not directly copy American law. Instead, U.S.
examples showed “how natural and inevitable racist legislation was” (p. 123).
Whitman’s book is a focused examination of a troubling episode in transna-
tional legal history and a reflection on the morality of American law.
In Part I, this Review will first trace Whitman’s forensic examination of
Nazi uses of American law. It will then examine an aspect of this history that
the author repeatedly notes but does not deeply explore: the relationship be-
tween domestic law and foreign relations. Part II sets the writing of the Nu-
remberg Laws within the context of Nazi foreign policy, suggesting the kind
of reasoning that may have informed concerns about the impact of domestic
German law on foreign relations. Part III compares the transnational history
of Nazi race law with the transnational history of American civil rights dur-
ing the early Cold War era. Bringing together Hitler’s American Model and
the international impact of American civil rights reveals two insights. First,
deeply contextualizing transnational histories reveals the way domestic law is
a feature of international relations and the global history of ideas. Second,
6 . Id . at 402.
7 . See 1 RAULHILBERG, THEDESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS (3d ed. 2003).
8 . See PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE
MAKING OFRACE INAMERICA 191–93 (2009).
9 . See AMY KATE BAILEY & STEWART E. TOLNAY, LYNCHED: THE VICTIMS OF
SOUTHERNMOB VIOLENCE (2015); PHILIPDRAY, AT THEHANDS OF PERSONSUNKNOWN: THE
LYNCHING OF BLACKAMERICA (2002).
10. Ford Foundation Professor of Comparative and Foreign Law, Yale Law School.
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and most important, American law can serve as a global example, promoting
both reform and also evil.
I. AMERICAN LAWAS AN EXAMPLE
“No one wants to imagine,” Whitman writes, “that America provided
any measure of inspiration for Hitler” (p. 3). He seeks to correct “what most
of us must think of as the obvious truth”: that there was no American influ-
ence on Nazi law (p. 3). Whitman writes in a tone of moral outrage, carefully
revealing his argument to readers he expects share his deep discomfort with
the idea that American law played a role in what would become the murder-
ous Nazi regime. Most scholarship directly on point, Whitman writes, rejects
the idea that U.S. law was influential (pp. 3–4). This is in spite of the fact
that, as the author details, historians have written of Nazi interest in other
aspects of American life, from their praise for President Franklin D. Roose-
velt’s New Deal government in the early 1930s,11 to engagement with the
American eugenics movement,12 to Hitler’s admiration for the removal of
and warfare against Native Americans.13
Historians of the United States and the world are less likely to think it to
be “obvious” that American ideas had no impact on the Nazis,14 but all read-
ers will appreciate Whitman’s care and precision in examining the evidence.
In two lengthy chapters, and introductory and concluding essays, he focuses
deeply on important Nazi texts, and traces within them the appearance of
American influence. Of great help to Americanists, Whitman provides his
own translations of excerpts of key German sources.15 He works to carefully
dismantle the previous literature denying that the U.S. example influenced
the Nazis. Because references to American law are, in some cases, explicit,
11. P. 6; see also KLAUS P. FISCHER, HITLER&AMERICA 49 (2011).
12 . Pp. 8–9; see EDWIN BLACK, WAR AGAINST THE WEAK: EUGENICS AND AMERICA’S
CAMPAIGN TO CREATE A MASTER RACE 269–77 (2003); DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF
EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THEUSES OFHUMANHEREDITY (1985).
13. Pp. 9–10. In a comparative study of American westward expansion and Nazi
thought, for example, Carroll P. Kakel, III, argues that Hitler “clearly saw America’s westward
expansion, as well as US Indian policy, as a prototype for Nazi notions and practices.”
CARROLL P. KAKEL, III, THE AMERICAN WEST AND THE NAZI EAST: A COMPARATIVE AND
INTERPRETIVE PERSPECTIVE 215–16 (2011).
14. Even if Whitman is correct about what “most of us” think, in the aftermath of the
transnational turn in U.S. historiography, historians would be more likely to assume a curren-
cy in American legal ideas about race in Germany. On transnational approaches to U.S. histo-
ry, see, for example, DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A
PROGRESSIVE AGE (1998); IAN TYRRELL, TRANSNATIONAL NATION: UNITED STATES HISTORY
IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE SINCE 1789 (2d ed. 2015); and RETHINKING AMERICAN HISTORY IN A
GLOBAL AGE (Thomas Bender ed., 2002). Historians of the United States embraced transna-
tional history in the last decade of the twentieth century, but Robin D.G. Kelley notes that Afri-
can American history has always been transnational. Robin D.G. Kelley, How the West Was
One: The African Diaspora and the Re-Mapping of U .S . History, in RETHINKING AMERICAN
HISTORY IN AGLOBALAGE, supra at 123, 124.
15 . See, e .g ., pp. 84–86 (translating selections from the 1933 Prussian Memorandum).
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Whitman’s approach enables him to be convincing on his core question of
whether Nazis were influenced by American law. In essence, they themselves
said they were.
Whitman argues that scholars have missed the influence of American
law on Nazi legal development because they have looked in the wrong places
and used the wrong interpretive tools (pp. 12–13). An overly narrow under-
standing of the legal history of American racism has led some scholars to re-
strict their search to segregation law (p. 33). Whitman, in contrast, makes his
case for American influence by focusing more broadly on race-related legis-
lation other than segregation: immigration and citizenship law and anti-
miscegenation law.
The Nuremberg Laws, enacted in 1935, conferred full rights only on citi-
zens of the German Reich (pp. 17, 29). A Reich citizen was a person “exclu-
sively a national of German blood, or racially related blood, who demon-
strates through his conduct that he is willing and suited to faithfully serve the
German Volk and Reich.”16 The laws banned marriage between Germans
and Jews and had other restrictions intended to protect what was thought of
as the “purity of German blood” (pp. 30–32).
When crafting the Nuremberg Laws, Germans looked to other countries
for examples of how to draft immigration and citizenship law that would en-
sure ethnic homogeneity (p. 16). “[T]he United States came to be regarded as
‘the leader in developing explicitly racist policies of nationality and immigra-
tion’ ” from the nineteenth century on, Whitman writes.17 U.S. racial limits
on immigration and naturalization were longstanding. The Naturalization
Act of 1790 allowed naturalization of “any alien, being a free white person.”18
Anti-Asian legislation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
was of particular interest. For example, in 1917 Congress created what was
called the “Asiatic Barred Zone,” which expanded upon previous restrictions
on Chinese and Japanese immigration and prohibited entry into the United
States of persons from much of Asia and the Pacific Islands.19 These kinds of
provisions put the United States “at the vanguard” of racist immigration re-
strictions (p. 36).
Also useful to Germans was the American law of second-class citizen-
ship. Until 1924, Native Americans were “nationals” but not citizens, and
residents of Puerto Rico were “foreign . . . in a domestic sense,” lacking U.S.
constitutional rights.20 African Americans were constitutionally entitled to
16. P. 30 (translating Reichsbürgergesetz [Imperial Citizenship Law], Sept. 15, 1935,
RGBL I at 1146, § 2(1) (Ger.)).
17. P. 36 (quoting DAVID SCOTT FITZGERALD & DAVID COOK-MARTÍN, CULLING THE
MASSES: THE DEMOCRATIC ORIGINS OF RACIST IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE AMERICAS 7
(2014)).
18. P. 34 (quoting Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795)).
19 . See pp. 35–36; Asiatic Barred Zone Act, Pub. L. No. 64–301, 39 Stat. 874 (1917) (re-
pealed 1952).
20 . See pp. 38–42 (quoting MARKMAZOWER, HITLER’S EMPIRE: HOW THENAZIS RULED
EUROPE 584 (2008)).
April 2019] The Outcome of Influence 1183
vote under the Fifteenth Amendment, but Southern states restricted access
to the ballot through poll taxes, literacy tests, and “grandfather clauses”
(p. 39).
The Nazis were familiar with these American laws (p. 43). Adolf Hitler
upheld the American example in Mein Kampf. After criticizing German law
for lacking needed restrictions, he wrote that “[t]here is currently one state
in which one can observe at least weak beginnings of a better conception.
This is of course . . . the American Union,” which “categorically refuses the
immigration of physically unhealthy elements, and simply excludes the im-
migration of certain races.”21 In Hitler’s view, this allowed the United States
to retain its positive “Nordic” racial character (p. 47).
There is ample praise for American law in Nazi writings, but Whitman
does not overread his sources. The Germans did not directly borrow Ameri-
can citizenship and disenfranchisement law in the sense of using American
statutes as a direct template (pp. 70–72). Instead, Whitman makes a modest,
well-supported argument that American law served as “a point of reference,”
turned to as a positive example as the Nazis codified their own brutal forms
of repression (pp. 50, 70–72).
In the Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor,
however, Whitman finds more: “the most unsettling signs of direct influ-
ence” of American law (pp. 72, 76). His chapter on the “Blood Law” will be
disturbing even for readers unsurprised to find that American ideas about
race informed the policies of the German government. A 1933 memoran-
dum circulated by Nazi radicals explicitly invoked American law as a posi-
tive example, and U.S. law was regularly discussed in a 1934 planning meet-
ing (p. 76). “American models were championed by the most radical Nazi
faction” (pp. 76–77). Whitman provides careful and convincing support for
his argument that “the Blood Law itself that emerged at Nuremberg bore the
marks . . . of American influence” (p. 77).
Both Germany and the United States had racist extremists (p. 77). The
distinct U.S. contribution to the Nazis was technique (p. 77). In particular,
the country had “the model of anti-miscegenation legislation” (p. 78). Laws
of thirty states invalidated forms of interracial marriage (p. 78), but many
went beyond that. They criminally punished the couples, which was rare
among other nations with bans on mixed marriages (p. 78). Under Maryland
law, for example, anyone violating the anti-miscegenation law “shall be
deemed guilty of an infamous crime, and be punished by imprisonment in
the penitentiary for not less than eighteen months nor more than ten
years.”22 The Nazis specifically discussed American criminalization of inter-
racial marriage when debating a section on “causing harm to the honor of
the race” (p. 86). According to the memorandum, “[i]t scandalously flouts
21. Pp. 45–46 (translating 2 ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF: EINE KRITISCHE EDITION
1115–17 (Christian Hartmann et al. eds., 2016).
22. P. 79 (emphasis omitted) (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CRIMES & PUNISHMENTS § 398
(1957) (repealed 1967)).
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the sentiments of the Volk when, for example, German women shamelessly
consort with Negroes.”23 Criminal prohibition only applied when “the asso-
ciation takes place in public and occurs in a shameless manner and gives
gross offense to the sentiments of the Volk (for example indecent dancing in
a pub with a Negro).”24 A rationale for this racist provision was that this kind
of “[p]rotection of racial honor” was “already practiced by other Völker. It is
well-know[n], for example, that the southern states of North America main-
tain the most stringent separation between the white population and col-
oreds in both public and personal interactions.”25
In order to ban interracial marriage, Germans and Americans had to be
able to put people into racial categories. The Nazis took great interest in the
American law of racial classification (pp. 79–80). Some states had a “one
drop rule,” classifying a person as black if they had any black ancestry.26 Ex-
amining this area led Whitman to “the most uncomfortable irony in this his-
tory” (p. 80). The Nazis declined to adopt the American approach because
they thought U.S. law was too harsh (p. 80).
Once the Nuremburg Laws were written, however, one of the drafters
reported with great regret that, at that time, “[f]or foreign policy reasons” the
criminalization of all interracial mixing of a sexual nature “could not be in-
stituted.”27 In addition, the importance of Jews in the German economy
made an effort to impose complete social segregation—like the model at-
tempted by some American states—impractical, so radicals had to give up on
full implementation.28 “Some of them admitted that diplomatic pressures
made it impossible, for the moment, to carry out the measures that they
deemed necessary; the objections of so many countries to targeting ‘colored
Races’ were too grave” (p. 96). This passage is significant because it clearly
demonstrates Nazi interest in American segregation law, and because the
Nazis found the practices of some American states to be too harsh to be ac-
23. P. 86 (translating NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHES STRAFRECHT: DENKSCHRIFT DES
PREUSSISCHEN JUSTIZMINISTERS [NATIONAL SOCIALIST CRIMINAL LAW: MEMORANDUM OF
PRUSSIANATTORNEYGENERAL] 47–49 (Hanns Kerrl ed., 1933)).
24. P. 86 (translating NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHES STRAFRECHT: DENKSCHRIFT DES
PREUSSISCHEN JUSTIZMINISTERS [NATIONAL SOCIALIST CRIMINAL LAW: MEMORANDUM OF
PRUSSIANATTORNEYGENERAL] 47–49 (Hanns Kerrl ed., 1933)).
25. P. 86 (translating NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHES STRAFRECHT: DENKSCHRIFT DES
PREUSSISCHEN JUSTIZMINISTERS [NATIONAL SOCIALIST CRIMINAL LAW: MEMORANDUM OF
PRUSSIANATTORNEYGENERAL] 47–49 (Hanns Kerrl ed., 1933)).
26 . See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 20
(rev. & updated 10th anniversary ed. 2006); PASCOE, supra note 8, at 119.
27 . Id . at 97–98 (translating Statement of Fritz Grau (June 6, 1934), reprinted in 2
QUELLEN ZUR REFORM DES STRAF- UND STRAFPROZESSRECHTS [SOURCES FOR REFORM OF
CRIMINAL AND TRIAL LAW] pt. 2, at 277, 278–79 (Jürgen Regge & Werner Schubert eds.,
1989)).
28 . See pp. 98–99.
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ceptable by other nations.29 Because of this, they restricted interracial associ-
ation only when Germans and nonwhites consorted in public (pp. 86–87).
Whitman’s evidence of direct and substantial Nazi discussion of U.S. law
when writing the Nuremburg Laws makes his core claims indisputable.
Along the way, however, Whitman assumes too little of his audience. In ex-
plaining the reasons American influence on Nazi law has largely been ig-
nored, he invokes too narrow a conception of how the history of race in the
United States is understood. He writes that “our general culture has so far
been slow to grasp” that “[t]he history of American racism is not just a histo-
ry of the Jim Crow South,” remembered principally for the battle against ra-
cial segregation (pp. 32–33, 137). Whitman also criticizes scholars who have
argued that the United States was not a Nazi model for failing to understand
the importance of immigration and citizenship restrictions based on race
(pp. 11–13). If this criticism fits that literature, it is, at best, outdated as ap-
plied to “our general culture.” Although the Black Lives Matter movement is
relatively new,30 an understanding that American racism is not simply a Jim
Crow South history has long been evident in the history of concerns about
police brutality and mass incarceration, including the police beating of Rod-
ney King in Los Angeles, California, in 1991.31 During the second half of the
twentieth century, there was widespread news coverage of racial conflict in
the North as well as the South over school desegregation and police brutali-
ty.32 Similarly, awareness of the role of race in immigration restrictions long
precedes the contemporary immigration crisis. This has been central to the
fields of Asian American and Latinx American history, and there has been
substantial debate in the press about racial profiling and travel restrictions
imposed on Muslims since 2001.33 Important accounts by historians regard-
ing race and immigration, and civil rights battles in the northern United
29. American anti-miscegenation laws were found to be unconstitutional in Loving v .
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). On interracial marriage in U.S. history, see generally PASCOE, supra
note 8, and RENEE C. ROMANO, RACE MIXING: BLACK-WHITE MARRIAGE IN POSTWAR
AMERICA (2003).
30 . See BARBARA RANSBY, MAKING ALL BLACK LIVESMATTER: REIMAGINING FREEDOM
IN THETWENTY-FIRSTCENTURY (2018).
31 . See generally ANNA DEAVERE SMITH, TWILIGHT: LOS ANGELES, 1992 (1994);
READING RODNEYKING/READINGURBANUPRISING (Robert Gooding-Williams ed., 1993).
32 . See generally JANET L. ABU-LUGHOD, RACE, SPACE, AND RIOTS IN CHICAGO, NEW
YORK, AND LOS ANGELES (2007); GERALDHORNE, FIRE THIS TIME: THEWATTSUPRISING AND
THE 1960S (1995); J. ANTHONY LUKAS, COMMON GROUND: A TURBULENT DECADE IN THE
LIVES OF THREE AMERICAN FAMILIES (1985); THOMAS J. SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY:
THE FORGOTTEN STRUGGLE FORCIVIL RIGHTS IN THENORTH (2008).
33 . See, e .g ., MOUSTAFA BAYOUMI, HOW DOES IT FEEL TO BE A PROBLEM?: BEING
YOUNG AND ARAB IN AMERICA (2008) (on the experience of Arab and Muslim Americans);
IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THECHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE (2003) (on the Chi-
cano community and protest in Los Angeles, California); MAEM. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS:
ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2004) (on undocumented mi-
grants); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002) (on immi-
grants after 9/11).
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States, appear in public history programming,34 and civil rights history is in-
corporated into K–12 curricula.35 This weakness does not undermine Whit-
man’s core arguments, however. It simply means that readers would be ad-
vised to turn to historians of race and American culture for an examination
of civil rights and historical memory.
II. RACE LAWANDNAZI FOREIGN POLICY
Whitman leaves much for other scholars to build on. The book does not
rely on the methods of contemporary transnational historians who trace the
path of ideas and movements through research in archives on different con-
tinents.36 He comments that relevant German sources are likely to be una-
vailable (p. 113). If they are unlikely to be in German government archives,
copies could be elsewhere, including private collections and the archives of
other governments. For example, it is highly likely that records relevant to
some aspects of Whitman’s story are in U.S. diplomatic records.37 Such rec-
34 . See, e .g ., American Experience: The Chinese Exclusion Act (PBS May 29, 2018); Eyes
on the Prize: The Keys to the Kingdom (1974-80) (Blackside Feb. 26, 1990) (documentary film
episode); Separate Is Not Equal: Brown v . Board of Education, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM
AM. HIST., http://americanhistory.si.edu/brown/history/index.html [https://perma.cc/GT3Y-
J4AR] (educational website).
35. Though K–12 curricula often incorporate race, immigration, and the civil rights bat-
tles, a study of K–12 curricula by LeGarrett J. King argued that coverage is simplistic, overly
celebratory, and incomplete. See, e .g ., LeGarrett J. King, The Status of Black History in U .S .
Schools and Society, 81 SOC. EDUC. 14 (2017).
36. A classic account is RODGERS, supra note 14. For transnational histories related to
race, see KEISHA N. BLAIN, SET THE WORLD ON FIRE: BLACK NATIONALIST WOMEN AND THE
GLOBAL STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM (2018); JAMES T. CAMPBELL, MIDDLE PASSAGES: AFRICAN
AMERICAN JOURNEYS TO AFRICA, 1787–2005 (2006); MARY L. DUDZIAK, EXPORTING
AMERICAN DREAMS: THURGOOD MARSHALL’S AFRICAN JOURNEY (2008); ADRIANE LENTZ-
SMITH, FREEDOM STRUGGLES: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND WORLD WAR I (2009); and NICO
SLATE, COLORED COSMOPOLITANISM: THE SHARED STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM IN THE UNITED
STATES AND INDIA (2012).
37. For example, there is surely information about the trip of the Association of Nation-
al Socialist German Jurists to the United States in September 23, 1935, in U.S. State Depart-
ment archival records at the U.S. National Archives, College Park, Maryland. See pp. 132–34.
Whitman writes that “it does not seem possible to learn more about how Fischer and his group
fared on their study trip,” p. 134, however he does not indicate that he consulted U.S. State De-
partment records, p. 191. In addition, original records from the U.S. Embassy in Germany are
likely to contain details about the 1934 meeting to draft the Nuremberg Laws. Sources about
actions in Germany may also be present in the archives of the United Kingdom and other
countries.
Multiarchival transnational research is now the gold standard in foreign relations history,
but some information about law development in other nations can be found in archives within
the United States. Dispatches from American diplomats in U.S. State Department archives
regularly include documents from other nations, including translations. This makes them an
outstanding, though underused, source for comparative and transnational legal history re-
search. For a description of what diplomatic archives contain and how to access them, see
Mary L. Dudziak, On Using U .S . Diplomatic Records for Research on African Constitutions: A
Guide to the Archives, NEWSL. AFR. SEC. ASS’N AM. L. SCHOOLS (2002), available at
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ords can especially illuminate German and American thinking about the
diplomatic consequences and how they were managed. This would have en-
abled Whitman to show with particularity the intersection between German
domestic law and foreign relations. The absence of such sources does not
undermine Whitman’s conclusion that American law was a model, which is
amply demonstrated in the German materials he relies upon, but archival
records would explain the foreign relations references in his sources and
would illuminate the fuller history of the intersection between international
relations and domestic law.
The dispatch from Ambassador Dodd mentioned at the opening of this
Review makes clear that the U.S. Embassy in Germany and the American
State Department kept tabs on Nazi law and legal figures.38 Aspects of this
history can be seen in the selected U.S. diplomatic records that have been
digitized by the State Department Historian’s Office. For example, Ambas-
sador Dodd reported to the Secretary of State on January 8, 1934, about an
issue of Deutsche Juristen Zeitung, the official publication of the leading
German jurists’ organization, which reviewed new anti-Jewish legislation.
The dispatch noted internal disagreement about harsh new provisions and
their possible impact on business interests.39 These records also make clear
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=319700 [https://perma.cc/8JUW-SQGX].
Because research in diplomatic history sources can be especially challenging, simply showing
up at the archives without advance planning will not be successful. The Society for Historians
of American Foreign Relations has posted a useful guide: Know Before You Go: What You
Should Know Before You Head to the National Archives, SOC’Y FOR HISTORIANS AM. FOREIGN
REL., https://shafr.org/research/know-before-you-go [https://perma.cc/2U9P-T7Z7]. See also
Plan Your Research Visit, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/research/start/plan-
your-visit [https://perma.cc/7PTC-C5GV]. A limited selection of U.S. State Department rec-
ords is published in the series Foreign Relation of the United States, which is available in most
research libraries and has recently been fully digitized. See About the Foreign Relations of the
United States Series, OFF. HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/about-frus
[https://perma.cc/9KBB-QB8P].
On methodologies combining legal and foreign relations history, and resources for this
kind of research, see Mary L. Dudziak, Legal History as Foreign Relations History, in
EXPLAINING THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 135 (Frank Costigliola & Mi-
chael J. Hogan eds., 3d ed. 2016).
38 . See Letter fromWilliam E. Dodd, supra note 1.
39. Letter from William E. Dodd, Ambassador in Ger., to the Sec’y of State (Jan. 8,
1934), in 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1934, EUROPE,
NEAR EAST AND AFRICA 291, 291–93 (1951), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1934v02/d237 [https://perma.cc/3Z6V-RQRY]. This record can be found using the search
engine of the Historian’s Office website. Careful page-by-page review of the volume would
likely reveal more about American diplomatic concern about German anti-Semitic law. This
would just be the tip of the iceberg, however, because only a small percentage of State Depart-
ment records are published or digitized. See generally WILLIAM B. MCALLISTER ET AL., OFFICE
OF THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TOWARD “THOROUGH, ACCURATE, AND RELIABLE”:
A HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SERIES (2015),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.history.state.gov/frus-history/ebooks/frus-history.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EN36-3QH6]. The full history would require on-site archival research at the
U.S. National Archives. See generally supra note 37 (discussing archival sources).
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that American diplomats knew that U.S. racism harmed their ability to call
out Nazi practices. For example, on January 19, 1934, Assistant Secretary of
State Robert Walton Moore wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull to raise
concern about a proposed congressional resolution calling upon President
Roosevelt to condemn Nazi persecution of Jews. If the president complied,
Moore argued, the German government would resent it, and there could be
“a very acrimonious discussion . . . which conceivably might, for example,
ask him to explain why the negroes [sic] of this country do not fully enjoy
the right of suffrage; why the lynching of negroes [sic] . . . is not prevented or
severely punished; and how the anti-Semitic feeling in the United States,
which unfortunately seems to be growing, is not checked.”40
These sources show that traces of a broader transnational history can be
found in readily accessible sources. Deeper archival research could uncover
the fuller history of the currency in legal ideas between the United States and
Nazi Germany. This kind of research could show a transnational legal histo-
ry that goes beyond Whitman’s core point of the U.S. model for the Nazis. It
could reveal the degree to which diplomatic troubles helped shape domestic
law in both Nazi Germany and the United States.
Whitman notes the impact of foreign relations on the formation of the
Nuremberg Laws, but his references are brief and cursory. He writes that
“[r]adical Nazi plans to pass legislation disfavoring ‘colored’ races met with
angry protests from many parts of the world, including Japan, India, and
South America” (p. 81). The Nazis faced the threat of boycotts, so “policy
makers felt pressure to tone their racist legislative program down” (p. 81).
This problem, along with domestic political conflict and internal bureaucrat-
ic conflict, “colored the history of the Nazi use of American law on marriage
and sexual mixing” (p. 81).
American-style law, based on a presumption of racial inequality, could
have negative foreign policy consequences for the Germans. East Asians,
South Asians, and South Americans were offended by the proposal making
“[c]ausing harm to the honor of the race” criminally punishable.41 When the
Nazis debated whether the Nuremberg Laws should be simply race based,
without reference to inferiority, or racist, implying not only the need for sep-
aration but the inferiority of non-Aryans, Whitman writes that some argued
that “avoiding any claim that Jews were inferior . . . would improve Germa-
ny’s international public relations” (p. 104). Their advice was rejected, but
this episode nevertheless shows an awareness of the impact of discrimination
on foreign relations.
40. Memorandum by Assistant Sec’y of State (Moore) to Sec’y of State (Jan. 19, 1934), in
2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 39, at 293, 293, https://
history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v02/d238 [https://perma.cc/Q8CB-T3A6].
41. P. 86 (translating NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHES STRAFRECHT: DENKSCHRIFT DES
PREUSSISCHEN JUSTIZMINISTERS [NATIONAL SOCIALIST CRIMINAL LAW: MEMORANDUM OF
PRUSSIANATTORNEYGENERAL] 47–49 (Hanns Kerrl ed., 1933)).
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Although Hitler’s American Model makes clear that foreign relations
mattered to the Nuremberg Laws, Whitman is not clear just what those for-
eign relations problems were and how they manifested themselves. In U.S.
Cold War history, for example, race discrimination harmed the U.S. global
image, but not all diplomatic offense mattered. American diplomats initially
dismissed foreign concern about American race discrimination but began to
pay attention when they came to understand that concrete U.S. interests
were at stake and that important alliances might be threatened.42 When the
United States sought to appeal to the hearts and minds of peoples in emerg-
ing independent countries, African and Asian criticism of race discrimina-
tion mattered, but Soviet criticism was dismissed as propaganda.43
Foreign relations turn on conceptions of national interest. It was clearly
not the Nazis’ objective, as a general matter, to keep from offending the
world.44 Instead, it is deeply interesting that one of the most despicable re-
gimes in world history cared enough about its global image that, at least in
1934, in certain respects, it took steps to guard against foreign offense. Just
what German interests were at stake when other countries criticized the Nu-
remburg Laws? Whitman writes that “many countries” objected (p. 96). He
singles out Japan and India, and he mentions more broadly East Asia, South
Asia, and South America (pp. 81, 86). Foreign relations historians would
want to know: Why these countries and regions? Why not others? Foreign
criticism is only a diplomatic problem when it interferes with something a
state cares about. Precision about what was at stake—for Germany and other
nations—could help illuminate the impact of Nazi law on foreign relations in
Germany before World War II.
The leading historian of Nazi foreign policy, Gerhard L. Weinberg,
writes that Hitler’s foreign policy was driven by two principles: race and
space. In his racial ideology—“a vulgarized version of Social Darwinism”—
progress depended on the purity of the race and the importance of selective
breeding.45 German power and prosperity would derive from its racial supe-
riority, and anything that undermined racial purity was a threat to its stand-
ing in the world.46 Jews were Hitler’s principal target, in part because he be-
lieved they were responsible for the outcome of World War I.47 Second in
line for Hitler’s hatred was “the Negro.”48 He thought of France as Germa-
42 . See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICANDEMOCRACY 29–39, 79–102 (2d ed. 2011).
43 . See id . at 29–39.
44 . See FISCHER, supra note 11, at 48 (“Hitler[’s] . . . single-minded goal [was] to expand
German power.”); see also ARISTOTLEA. KALLIS, NAZI PROPAGANDA AND THE SECONDWORLD
WAR (2005).
45. GERHARD L. WEINBERG, HITLER’S FOREIGN POLICY 1933–1939: THE ROAD TO
WORLDWAR II, at 6–7 (rev. ed. 2010).
46 . Id .
47 . Id .
48 . Id . at 7–8.
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ny’s great enemy in part because of the French embrace of human equality,
and he greatly despised French introduction of black troops from Africa in
World War I and the growing presence of blacks in Europe.49
Under Hitler’s concept of space, racial vitality depended on territorial
expansion. Increased agricultural land mattered to a nation’s strength be-
cause it would feed a growing populous.50 Increased population would pro-
vide the manpower for war, and war would, in turn, enable Germany to ex-
pand its territory.51 The focus on space made war an inevitable feature of
foreign policy.52 Race and space informed Hitler’s approach to day-to-day
matters of foreign policy.53 He was not interested in diplomacy for its own
sake. When Nazi diplomats urged minor changes in policy for the purpose of
improving Hitler’s international reputation, they were shunted aside.54
The principles of race and space help explain Hitler’s approach to rela-
tions with different nations, Weinberg argues.55 For example, he looked up-
on Great Britain differently than France, with a mix of admiration as well as
hatred, because he thought of the British upper class as the product of selec-
tive breeding—a model for Germany.56 Principally concerned with continen-
tal Europe, Hitler was initially not especially interested in the Far East and
the United States.57 He admired racist U.S. immigration law, which he ini-
tially thought of as the source of American strength, but during the Depres-
sion he concluded that the United States was a weak country because it was a
“mongrel society.”58
When German proposals to prohibit interracial marriage in 1933 “pro-
duced an especially violent reaction in the Far East” and protests from the
Japanese and Chinese governments,59 the German government issued a
statement attempting to reassure the objecting countries and told the press
“not to refer to the ‘Yellow Peril.’ ”60 The problem remained sensitive, how-
ever, due to incidents involving Asians in Germany.61 The Germans re-
49 . Id . at 8–9.
50 . Id . at 8.
51 . Id . at 8–9. Nazi leaders were “obsessed” with what they thought of as “North Ameri-
can precedent”—westward expansion—but sought to exceed American racial and territorial
accomplishments, writes Kakel. See KAKEL, supra note 13, at 216.
52 . WEINBERG, supra note 45, at 8.
53 . Id . at 10.
54 . Id . at 13.
55 . Id .
56 . Id . at 15.
57 . Id . at 19–20.
58 . Id . at 20.
59 . Id . at 96.
60 . Id . at 96–97.
61 . Id .
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sponded with special treatment for them, which was not extended to blacks
and Jews.62
What German interests would have led the Nazis to want to improve
their image in parts of Asia? Early in Hitler’s term as chancellor, Germany
especially sought to expand its trade with China.63 Exporting German ar-
maments to China would help build up Germany’s arms industry.64 Pay-
ments would lead to greater purchasing power for acquiring needed raw ma-
terials.65 Germany also had a trade-related interest in Japan involving
soybeans in Manchuria (which Japan occupied), used by Germany for agri-
cultural feed.66 Trade was paramount as well in relations with Latin Ameri-
can countries in an effort to increase German exports, especially arma-
ments.67 The Germans also hoped to displace U.S. trade in South America
and to acquire raw materials for war readiness.68 Whether Germany moder-
ated its discrimination in order to protect these specific trade relations can
only be confirmed archivally, but there were distinct interests which may
have been of sufficient importance for the German government to be re-
sponsive when domestic practices offended these trading partners.
Hitler’s approach to foreign policy makes the concern about foreign re-
action at the 1934 meeting on the Nuremberg Laws more curious. It appears
to be different from the American concern during the Cold War about the
U.S. need to tamp down criticism that undermined the U.S. image and ham-
pered global leadership.69 It would appear that Germany was not seeking to
signal its respect for the humanity of Asians by moderating their treatment
of non-Aryans. Instead, their interest was likely more specific and strategic.
Because feed for German agriculture aided Hitler’s goal of an expanding
Volk, and arms exports built the capacity of an arms industry essential to us-
ing war for German expansion, criticism by particular nations like China
and Japan threatened Nazi pursuit of the principles of race and space.70
62 . Id . at 97.
63 . Id .
64 . Id . at 98. German-Chinese relations in 1933–36 were also driven by Chinese leader
Chiang Kai-shek’s parallel interest in the confluence of trade and militarization. See WILLIAM
C. KIRBY, GERMANY AND REPUBLICANCHINA 102–44 (1984).
65 . WEINBERG, supra note 45, at 97–98.
66 . Id . at 100–05. German outreach to Japan was moderated, however, in part in an ef-
fort to maintain German relations with China, thought to be of greater importance. See id .
67 . Id . at 124–25.
68 . Id . Secondary to trade was the growing interest in the National Socialist party
among Germans and persons of German descent in South America. Id . Weinberg notes that
“the main effect of German policy appears to have been to lend impetus to American attempts
to convert the Monroe Doctrine into something resembling a defensive alliance against Ger-
many.” Id . at 125. In this way, “unintentionally, Germany was helping to bring together the
nations of the Western hemisphere.” Id .
69 . See DUDZIAK, supra note 42.
70 . SeeWEINBERG, supra note 45, at 97–98, 100–05, 124–25.
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It is not Whitman’s goal to fully examine this diplomatic history. His ef-
fort instead turns on close examination of a particular set of German and
U.S. texts, and these sources enable his important contributions. There is a
fuller story, however, of the currency of ideas between Nazi Germany and
the United States and the role diplomatic pressure played in drafting the Nu-
remberg Laws. Hitler’s American Model is thereby suggestive of lines of in-
quiry that other scholars could explore archivally. Illuminating this history,
and comparing it with the experience of other nations, could deeply further
our understanding of the intersection between foreign affairs and domestic
law. Part III illustrates the value of comparison by turning briefly to an im-
portant example of the impact of domestic law on foreign relations: Ameri-
can civil rights during the early years of the Cold War.
III. RACISM, DIPLOMACY, ANDTRANSNATIONALHISTORY
A prominent example of the way diplomacy can affect race law is the
way American race law figured in foreign relations during the Cold War, a
topic historians have amply documented.71 The impact of American law on
U.S. Cold War foreign relations was, in essence, a negative history that gave
the United States an incentive to support social change. Racial segregation
and state-supported discrimination undermined the image of the United
States in the world. This was at a time when the United States emerged as the
leader of the “free world” and promoted democracy over communism as a
form of government. Because the U.S. government claimed that democracy
was superior to other forms of government and was characterized by broad
protection of political rights,72 the nation was vulnerable to criticism when
news about lynching, disenfranchisement, and discrimination against Afri-
can Americans was widely covered in the world press. Peoples of other na-
tions asked why their countries should follow the U.S. example when within
the world’s leading democracy African Americans were segregated and de-
nied voting rights. Diplomatic records reveal the negative impact on U.S.
standing in many countries.73
U.S. State Department records and other archives show the ways Ameri-
can leaders came to believe that international media coverage of disenfran-
chisement, segregation, and police brutality against African Americans un-
dermined the U.S. image, and the way they attempted to manage the harm to
U.S. foreign relations.74 U.S. diplomats examined the impact of this issue on
relations with particular countries and developed strategies for countering
71 . See CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944–1955 (2003); THOMAS
BORSTELMANN, THE COLD WAR AND THE COLOR LINE: AMERICAN RACE RELATIONS IN THE
GLOBAL ARENA (2001); DUDZIAK, supra note 42; BRENDA GAYLE PLUMMER, RISING WIND:
BLACKAMERICANS ANDU.S. FOREIGNAFFAIRS, 1935–1960 (1996).
72 . SeeDUDZIAK, supra note 42, at 27.
73 . Id . at 29–30, 42.
74 . Id . at 46–49.
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it.75 This carried over to the realm of law reform. The United States filed
briefs in civil rights cases, relying on State Department evidence that segre-
gation harmed U.S. foreign relations.76 The John F. Kennedy Administration
relied on Senate testimony by Secretary of State Dean Rusk on what would
become the Civil Rights Act of 1964.77 He explained that the Act would help
undo the harm that race discrimination was doing to U.S. foreign relations.78
Law reform at the state level also mattered. When diplomats from newly in-
dependent African nations were denied service by restaurants in Maryland,
generating diplomatic crises, Pedro San Juan, Director of the State Depart-
ment Office of Special Protocol, urged the Maryland state legislature to pass
a bill prohibiting race discrimination in public accommodations, arguing
that it was needed to help the country win the Cold War.79
When a country moderates its domestic law in the face of foreign criti-
cism, the response can be carefully calibrated. For example, foreign affairs
affected President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s response to the Little Rock, Ar-
kansas, school desegregation crisis in 1957, but not less high-profile aspects
of segregation.80 When the world press widely condemned Arkansas Gover-
nor Orval Faubus’s defiance of a federal judicial order, and the resulting mob
violence blocking desegregation in Little Rock, Eisenhower sent federal
troops to resolve the crisis and restore the American image.81 Once the im-
mediate crisis was over, however, intense global attention did not continue.
When Arkansas and other states passed laws bureaucratizing school attend-
ance—ensuring that, for a time, very few African Americans would attend
previously white schools—there was no diplomatic crisis because the foreign
press did not notice.82 In this way, foreign pressure informed federal actions
aiding image management but had less of an impact when it came to on-the-
ground social change. The international interest was not driven by the ab-
sence of substantive equality, but by the brutal extremes that made front
pages around the world.
This Cold War history broadens the implications of Whitman’s recogni-
tion that seemingly domestic legal matters can figure in foreign relations,
and foreign relations can affect domestic law. The international role of do-
75 . Id . at 55–56.
76 . Id . at 79–82. See generallyMary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative,
41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988) (discussing the Justice Department’s involvement in civil rights cas-
es through filing amicus briefs arguing that racial segregation harmed U.S. foreign policy inter-
ests).
77. DUDZIAK, supra note 42, at 184.
78 . Id . at 184–85.
79 . Id . at 167–69; Renee Romano, No Diplomatic Immunity: African Diplomats, the
State Department, and Civil Rights, 1961–1964, 87 J. AM. HIST. 546, 569–71 (2000).
80 . See DUDZIAK, supra note 42, at 128–31; Mary L. Dudziak, The Little Rock Crisis and
Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance, and the Image of American Democracy, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
1641 (1997).
81 . See DUDZIAK, supra note 42, at 119, 128–41.
82 . Id . at 149–51.
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mestic law is not limited to the borrowing of legal texts,83 the transnational
promotion of legal norms (like the efforts to take American-style law to oth-
er nations),84 or the kind of transnational influence of a nation’s law demon-
strated by Hitler’s American Model. Domestic law can also be an aspect of a
nation’s diplomacy. This raises a research question for others of how, exact-
ly, the confluence of American and Nazi law mattered in international rela-
tions, for Germany and the United States, during the period when the impli-
cations of Nazi ideology became clear. Such scholarship might more broadly
conceptualize the transnational history of domestic law.
CONCLUSION
In revealing the way American law helped normalize racist legislation
for the Nazis, Hitler’s American Model is more than a snapshot of a regretta-
ble past. Whitman is careful to hew to the goal of tracing the relationship be-
tween U.S. and Nazi texts. He does not step beyond this to offer a lesson
from history for the contemporary world, but the contemporary implica-
tions of his work amplify its importance.
Germany in the 1930s slightly moderated the formal law of the country’s
racist practices in the face of international criticism. The United States, in
later years, came to believe that seeking to overcome its most blatant racial
injustices was in the nation’s interest and was crucial to American world
leadership. During our own era, when the American president uses the bully
pulpit for bullying, Hitler’s American Model provides a chilling example of
the way the United States can influence the world, for good or for ill. History
also offers hope, however, showing that global opprobrium can have a mod-
erating effect, as it did for both Nazi law and American practices. For now,
the regret and moral outrage with which Whitman offers his evidence is fit-
ting, for it is a time when the possibility that the United States serves as a
model for evil is all too real.
83 . See generally THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (Sujit Choudhry ed.,
2006).
84 . See PAUL D. CARRINGTON, SPREADING AMERICA’S WORD: STORIES OF ITS LAWYER-
MISSIONARIES (2005); SALLY ENGLEMERRY, COLONIZINGHAWAI‘I: THE CULTURAL POWER OF
LAW 35–39, 86–89 (2000).
